Somalia: Between Hope and Frustration

By Medhane Tadesse

The good news is that Ugandan troops continued to arrive in Mogadishu. Another good news is that the TFG is preparing to host a National Reconciliation Conference, scheduled to open in mid-April, whereby Somali clans and sub-clans would send delegates to resolve clan conflicts accrued over the past 16 years. The bad news is related to the same. There is no agreed framework among the major political factions, interest groups and clan leaders on how to go about the reconciliation process. Whether the would-be reconciliation is limited to mundane issues or tackle high political agendas of power sharing remains to be critical to most of the political actors. In this regard there is no good news. Another bad news is insurgent groups now seem to be strengthening in the capital launching frequent attacks targeting the key locations of the interim government troops and its Ethiopian allies. Insurgents believed to be the remnants of Somalia’s Council of Islamic Courts have staged almost daily attacks against the government, its armed forces, and the Ethiopian military. Armed criminality is on the rise in some areas. The government seemed to have nothing to do against the growing insecurity. A sizable number of Mogadishu residents have come to seek support and advice even from “former” warlords on security and political issues. That seems a paradox. but is real.

Reportedly, disaffected groups, clan leaders, former warlords and Islamists maintain an underground arsenal of automatic rifles, grenades and other weapons. The dissolution of the ICU, which had held control of most of south-central Somalia three months back, has created a power vacuum that the TFG, or any peacekeeping force, is not at present in a position to fill. While de facto political authority has fallen to clan leaders and the reality is that the TFG cannot maintain a presence or begin to administer the capital effectively without active support and partnership from powerful local constituencies and clans. And creating a workable partnership, hence eliciting active support requires much more than calling for a reconciliation conference among Somali clans. The most eye-catching and significant report this week is, however, the position paper, or a kind of Manifesto, claimed to be released by Hawiya politicians. The political message of the paper, which is rumored to have been the result of a controversial meeting of Hawiye traditional-religious leaders, scholars and intellectuals, is not new at all. Infact most of its contents were discussed by this writer in this same paper. The only difference is the intention. My critique, unlike the statement of the Hawiye leaders, was intended to make the TFG succeed.

What is new in the Hawiye front, I would argue, is the slowly emerging political articulation and its linkage with the increasing insurgency. Very few people now exactly what is going on in the southern neighborhoods of Mogadishu, but the fact that the Hawiye are not happy at all with almost all the policy statements of the TFG may be enough to predict what will happen in the short-term. There is reason to believe that Islamists and disgruntled Hawiye leaders may be trying to reconstitute themselves by forging a common cause. This underscores the argument that Hawiye political leaders are not happy with the way the TFG is planning to make its moves on the most critical aspects of political transition in Somalia. This ranges from disarmament, the state of emergency, the political appointments made so far by President Abdullahi Yosuf, the nature of the newly constituted armed force, the increasing attacks on civilians, to the planning of the national reconciliation conference. This explains why most of Mogadishu-based clans and political factions are not enthusiastic about working with or for the TFG, and if the TFG leadership continue the trend of “ nothing, but my way”, it could only guarantee one terrible thing: the rise and consolidation of an insurgency in Mogadishu. The Islamist has ample thorny issues to pick from and use to justify the insurgency. Most of them were provided by the TFG itself. This will make the work of the spoilers much more easier. The emerging insurgents could easily take advantage of the mistakes of the TFG leadership and exploit it for political purposes. It is becoming easy for the remnants of the ICU to justify their insurgency on the widespread fear as well as suspicion of the Hawiye clan regarding eminent Darod domination. This is the most effective propaganda material that Somali Islamists have at this point in time, which is helping them to mobilize support for an insurgency in and around Mogadishu. The TFG and its allies need to show extra care on this matter.

An inclusive dialogue with the Hawiye and a genuine political process are the only ways to achieve a sustainable peace that denies dissatisfied groups a rallying point for conflict. The TFG should try hard to deny the Islamists their new cards and block their comeback. The march of the TFG to Mogadishu, with Ethiopian support, was considered to be a rare opportunity for Somalia to come out of its paralysis. The TFG is still the most promising enterprise in the recent political developments in Somalia. As things stand, still the TFG has every reason to succeed provided that it takes its role and mandate as a force in charge of responsible political transition in Somalia. Above all, the TFG needs to revisit its strategy and rewrite some of its policy proposals on the most priority agendas such as disarmament and national reconciliation. Thus, despite raising its military profile, Ethiopian support and the value of AU peacekeeping, and most importantly the presence of a critical mass of interest groups in Mogadishu in support of peace and tranquility, the TFG is still unable to show it is in command. This may still lead to some form of military consolidation of the TFG, but will clearly result in a political fragmentation and deterioration in security. This has a potential to dramatically change the nature of the Somali conflict from a manageable crisis to an all out civil war. The crux of the matter is the TFG leadership’s actual-potential political moves and perceptions of the Hawiye political leadership towards the same moves. The recent rhetoric on the part of the Hawiye elite and some movements around the looming insurgency need to be taken seriously. Unless military efforts are matched by serious political moves, the TFG will soon loose its edge. It is a pity that, having all the ingredients and potential to succeed, the TFG is still unable to show a good deal of pragmatism and engage in confidence building measures to attract its ardent opponents.

March 9, 2007

Medhane Tadesse of CPRD is a long time specialist on issues of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. He can be reached at mt3002et@yahoo.com