Unhappy masses and Islamic philantropism

By Medhane Tadesse

The radicalization of Islam is in full swing in many countries of the Horn, including Ethiopia. Developments in recent years both in Middle East and the wider region have played crucial role to the spread of militant Islam in many countries of the Horn. This piece is specifically concerned with the recent advances made by the Wahhabi movement in the sub-region. The one common element of these apparently emerging phenomena is its attempt to address what was formerly addressed by politics. Instability and dysfunctional state have rendered many societies (notably the Somali) susceptible to external extremist influences. This largely explains the rise and expansion of militant Islamic movements in the sub-region, including of course Somalia.
As much as there has been an internal fertile ground for extremism, the ideological roots and financial backing of militant Islamic groups lie outside the region. The obvious villain is Islamic philantropism. Although many of these Islamic aid agencies are relatively apolitical, seeking only to deepen the Islamic faith in Somalia, some of them promote ideas that could produce a new generation of young Ethiopians, Eritreans and Somalis who are much more receptive to radical Islamic agendas. Thus, the radicalization of Islam is both a product of domestic social and political trend and an essentially extraterritorial phenomenon sustained by donors in Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states.

Such organizations are displacing the state by deploying large amount of resources, manpower and organizational skill. The fact is that the state cannot afford to satisfy the unmet needs of its population, where as Islamic aid agencies are providing free or subsidized schooling, running health posts and community outreach services, supporting Mosques, and offering scholarships for study in the Middle East. A full study of religious conflict and its relationship with politics and peace in the sub-region or for that matter Ethiopia is beyond the scope of this policy commentary. It is rather a small reflection to attract decision makers on the salient feature and the mutations in the major faiths in Ethiopia, on how they continue to appeal to the mass of the people (especially the young and marginalized), and on the change in religious equilibrium and its impact on peace and a culture of tolerance, together with its possible translation into political agendas. Apart from a general admonition to be ever aware of the ambitions of (the Christian right and ) the Islamists, there may seem to be little of a direct nature that the government can do to arrest the immediate trend or change the situation, other than vehemently protect the secularity of the State as defined in the Constitution.

Of great consideration is the widespread poverty, which lies at the heart of militancy, the rapid change in religious equilibrium and the growing influence of religion stimulated by the economic weakness of the state, and the apparent bankruptcy of secular ideologies. The post-colonial African state is widely seen as having failed to provide the basic social services in terms of education, health, security and economic freedoms. But the crisis is not one of economics only or of security only: it is one of hope , one of soul, one of believing into a model or shape for the future, and for many this means that the hour of the miracle worker (religion) has finally come. In Ethiopia the failure of the statist, socialist and rigorously nationalist ideology of the Derg to cope with the problems of modernization created an ideological vacuum that religious institutions have been competing to occupy, at least in part. This, in many ways is a reaction to the wider political crisis of the Ethiopian state in which the legitimacy of the government is being challenged from ethnic, human rights, economic and even secular ideological fronts.

Religious approaches to intractable social and economic ills are being phrased anew, something which has largely meant inventing new religious paradigm, approaches and organizational forms. This explains the recent advances made by the charismatic protestant and the wahhabi movement in Ethiopia. The one common element of these apparently disparate phenomena is their attempt to address what was formerly addressed by politics. They are bent on displacing the state by deploying large amount of resources, manpower and organizational skill. Whether it is to dream of a better world or to try to live less poorly in this one, many people in Ethiopia (as elsewhere when the state fails) have switched their allegiances from politics to religion. If the Ethiopian state cannot prevail because its economic policies continue to be poorly financed, directed or implemented then it will have little in the way of positive change to offer the masses, and substantial numbers, perhaps the majority, of Ethiopians will continue to depend on religion, but are likely to become ever more ready to experiment and accept different versions of it. This has the potential to lead to a very fluid and unsettled domestic political situation.

Given the widespread rise of new religious movements in the rest of Africa, and their frequent external financing, the challenge for the State in Ethiopia is to to learn how to live with this new phenomenon, to be sensitive to its dangers, possibly deal with some of its grievances, seek to reach accommodation with it while protecting (up to a point) the interests of long established faith groups, such as the EOC and mosques. In doing so the objective of the government must be to prevent civil conflict on the back of religious differences, for which in Ethiopia all the ingredients are present - implying a regulating and mediating role by a democratically legitimate secular state. •

March 3, 2007

Medhane Tadesse of CPRD is a long time specialist on issues of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. He can be reached at mt3002et@yahoo.com