Avoid Delay and Confusion

By Medhane Tadesse

African Union peacekeeping plan, a UN assessment team and post-conflict reconstruction mission, an EU working document, US reconciliation and capacity building strategy are some of the initiatives being floated in response to the call for a post-conflict peace and reconstruction strategy in Somalia. This multiplicity of initiatives, interested institutions and pledges indicates a high degree of concern about the issue of peace and security in Somalia. Probably so. Unfortunately, none of these initiatives and policy packages is serious, comprehensive and realistic. Let’s start with the most practical and inescapable political issues. Any stabilisation plan needs to be geographically defined and focused. What is the geographic focus and coverage of the peace support operations? Everyone seems confused. It is laughable to hear that some of the original plans covered all territories of the former Somali republic. I am not sure which map the different institutions to refer to Somalia are using. One major failure of all international initiatives so far and the major structural weakness of all Somali peace processes is the inability to correctly define which part of Somalia they want to stabilise. What is needed now is a stabilisation plan for southern Somalia. This must be clear to everyone. There is no choice here. Further confusion would be nothing short of wasting the most crucial time for Somalia and the TFG.

Another weakness is evident too. Lack of coherent planning. There is a need to develop a clear guideline and concept of operations for all the activities of the AU peacekeeping mission. The overall objectives of the mission and the ways and means to achieve it should be spelled out in detail and agreed by the other crucial players and partner organisations. A clear challenge for the UN has been the lack of effective interface with Africa’s regional and sub-regional institutions. The UN could have done more than promising to take over at some in time. The UN was meant to assist the African Union with planning and assessments for its mission in Somalia and by preparing to support the deployment of its peace support mission. The line of communication is still there. What is not there is coherence and synergy between the two planning and implementation modalities. A detailed activity plans, including who does what, need to be developed by both institutions. Clarity is a fundamental principle that should guide mission deployment and transition. It is true that the UN is eyeing to takeover the would be AU mission. After how many months? It is not exactly decided or agreed upon. Opening the way for the usual confusion of mission transition that we are grappling with in Sudan.

The AU will need a clear, consistent mandate: if its mandate does change halfway, then this must be known from the very beginning and a contingency plan is in place. The current planning lacks almost all of the following: clarity, objectivity, flexibility and sustainability. Two other trends are noteworthy. All UN cum AU interventions so far draw attention to the lack of a theoretical blueprint and a common framework to guide conflict related interventions in Africa. They are also all ad hoc responses to specific pressing problems. All are worthwhile. Some are well coordinated, while others are not. This is not surprising at all. The challenge of UN peacekeeping and peace enforcement in Africa is the challenge of unpicking the problems of creating an effective interface with Africa’s regional organisations. The rest is gossip. The obvious one and persisting issue is that the pledge and rhetoric from Western powers is not matched by a genuine commitment. Equally problematic is that the formal mandates of the UN and Africa’s organizations, and decisions taken by their highest bodies do not match the requirements, commitments and capacities for monitoring or implementing these resolutions. Given the challenge ahead, from protection and training to disarmament and institution building, a clear division of labor and modalities of implementation is required. Clarity is required on the geographic and operational definition of external engagement. A comprehensive definition of the scope and mandate of the mission should be articulated in both the policy and any subsequent deployment plan to avoid confusion in the middle of the operations. The right sequencing must be outlined from the start regarding the role, responsibilities, and deliverables of each institution, notably the UN.

For instance where does the responsibility fall for implementing one or some of these commitments in Somalia? Does it fall upon AU? IGASOM? Or the UN? If the AU does not succeed, does it revert to the UN? How and when? What should be the exact role and reaction of the UN? The main job of the UN should have been to help in the efforts being made to bring coherence to these sub-systems in the first place. This tells you everything you need to know about the current disillusionment regarding the planning of a peace support mission for Somalia. What is needed is an effective process, and an institution that could maintain it.If the UN was serious and committed to the initiative, these are the steps it would have taken. Suffice to say that failing to act properly and quickly will have disastrous consequences. •

February 16, 2007

Medhane Tadesse of CPRD is a long time specialist on issues of peace and security in the Horn of Africa. He can be reached at mt3002et@yahoo.com